Peer Prediction Method with Reduced Payments

ACM EC 06. Jurca and Faltings

Work extends my “Peer Prediction” paper, written with Nolan Miller and Richard Zeckhauser, on eliciting honest reports, by comparing reports between people.

Automatically selects a scoring rule, with lower expected payments but still incentive compatible.

Has some mechanism for probabilitistically filtering out unusual ratings. I’ll have to look at the paper to see the details of this.

Claims that the honest reporting equilibrium is evolutionarily stable, meaning that small coalitions can’t attack it. Again, I’ll have to take a look at this.


About Paul Resnick

Professor, University of Michigan School of Information Personal home page
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